manner in which courts have juggled these prin ciples, and proposes a restructuring that would refocus the guideline on just one of them. My conclusion raises some larger questions about how the guidelines handle post-offense conduct.
I. Background Section 3E1.1 grew out of the Commission's dilemma in deciding how guilty pleas should be treated under the guidelines. During the early phases of developing the guidelines, the Commis sion considered a proposal to provide a fixed, automatic "discount" for guilty pleas.3 Such a provision would have codified pre-guideline practices. The Commission's data indicated that defendants who pled guilty received, on average, sentences between thirty and forty percent lower than if they had gone to trial.4 Many viewed this plea discount as a necessary incentive to encourage guilty pleas, and guilty pleas as a necessary lubri cant for an overburdened criminal justice system.5
Indeed, Commission research suggested that eighty five percent of federal criminal sentences involved some form of plea bargaining.6 The automatic plea discount proposal would have retained an incentive for such plea bargaining, but in a more predictable form than during the pre-guideline era.
Nonetheless, the original Commission rejected the automatic discount, fearing that it might be construed as a penalty for defendants who exercised their constitutional right to a jury trial.7 Moreover, because it awarded a benefit for pleading guilty, regardless of the nature of the offense or other post offense conduct, it was thought that the proposal might result in "unjustified windfalls" to some defendants, and "would not be in keeping with the public's perception of justice."8
The Commission thus faced a conundrum: how could an encouragement for guilty pleas be built into the guidelines without incurring the disadvan tages?and perhaps constitutional infirmities?of an automatic sentence discount? The Commission settled on the unique solution of ? 3E 1.1: rather than rewarding guilty pleas per se, it invited judges to I provide a benefit for "acceptance of responsibility" ("a/r"). The oddity of this provision is revealed by its absence in state guideline systems.9 The Commis sion apparently felt that ? 3E1.1 could advance the same purposes of an automatic plea discount without the unseemly results. What precisely were the advantages of the plea discount?
A. The Cooperation Paradigm
First, a guilty plea provided immediate, concrete benefits to society at large: "such pleas conserve the resources of the criminal justice system, and ...
witnesses (particularly victims) are spared the stress of a trial."10 The "acceptance of responsibility"
provision was designed to advance these interests by encouraging guilty pleas, but could also encourage other "socially desirable actions," such as "tak [ing] affirmative steps towards disassociation from past criminal conduct, and . . . rectify [ing] the harm done to others."11 The intent of this prong of a/r is to provide incentives for a defendant to engage in certain socially-desirable conduct?meaning prima rily, though not exclusively, pleading guilty? between the time of his offense and the time of sentencing. This is an expression of what I term the "cooperation paradigm" of ? 3E1.1.
B. The Remorse Paradigm
In the Commission's view, however, rewarding guilty pleas (and a/r) also had another purpose, less oriented to gaining immediate benefits for society, and more oriented towards giving a break to defendants with certain personal characteristics. The
Commission observed that "the guilty plea 'is the first step toward rehabilitation, '"12 and that other conduct demonstrating a/r (such as disassociation from criminal conduct and rectification of past harms) "is a sound indicator of rehabilitative potential."13 This hypothesis is associated with the second major animating principle of ? 3E1.1, which I term the "remorse paradigm." Under this paradigm, ? 3E1.1 is less concerned with the objective post offense conduct of a defendant, and more concerned with the defendant's subjective state of mind towards his offense. Although conduct is a relevant indicator in this inquiry, conduct alone, no matter how cooperative, is not dispositive.
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C. Balancing the Paradigms
The Commission thus posited two purposes for rewarding a/r: (1) encouraging desirable post offense conduct, and (2) In light of such concerns, ? 3E1.1 is clearly in need of reform. Indeed, the Commission itself has not been insensitive to the problems surrounding the guideline. In 1991, a working group prepared a lengthy report on acceptance of responsibility.36 Unfortunately, although the working group raised important questions concerning ambiguity, dispar ity, and appropriate distinctions between different types of post-offense conduct, the group's report focused on relatively narrow proposals to add an extra level of discount to ? 3E 1.1 and to address self incrimination concerns that had produced a circuit split. The working group's discussion of these matters was thoughtful and surely contributed to subsequent amendments of the guideline, but the bigger questions received short shrift.37
IV. Proposals for Reform
As the Judicial Conference has suggested, the time is ripe for more substantial reform of ? 3E 1.1. In particular, I propose that the provision be clearly focused on one purpose, specifically, encouraging desired post-offense conduct. Section 3E1.1 might be restructured along the following lines: The cooperation adjustment is generally consistent with existing practices. Those who plead guilty will routinely receive a benefit and those who go to trial will not. But, also as in the present system, these adjustments would not be automatic: defendants who plead guilty may still lose their benefit for violating the terms of pretrial release, obstructing justice, or engaging in comparably poor behavior. Defendants who go to trial may still qualify for a reduction based on other aspects of to the level of obstruction of justice. In short, the remorse paradigm would be stripped out of ? 3E1.1.41
Alternatively, the Commission might consider either returning to the notion of a fixed, automatic plea discount, or eliminating ? 3E1.1 altogether. Both solutions would address the current ambiguity of the guideline, as well as the problematic role of remorse in the current system, but both of these solutions present difficulties of their own. A plea discount offers less flexibility than a cooperation discount, leaving much cooperative behavior unrewarded, and possibly producing the sorts of other not only to generate needless litigation, but to deny the utility of a separate, independent incentive solely for the entry of a plea. As a consequence, either the other factors interfere with the court's ability to reward a plea, or, if the reduction is rewarded for a plea, the other factors are lost. The court is unable to distinguish between a begrudging, reluctant timely plea (for which the full three points must be awarded), and a timely "plea plus" where the defendant pleads as well as shows genuine remorse, demonstrates assistance to authorities, has undergone post-offense rehabilitative efforts, and/or some of the other factors which the guideline attempts to reward. Factors such as how much the defendant has to "admit" (or not "falsely deny"), the timeliness of the plea, the extent of the defendant's remorse, or the extent of the government's "preparation," account for much of the litigation and confusion surrounding this guideline, because the determination of the entire guideline can turn on these issues. Worse, they cloud and complicate the court's efforts, and need, to reward the entry of a plea in order to conserve judicial and other resources. The current guideline tries to do too much with one adjustment (the separate adjust ment has not been effective, as discussed below), and consequently it does not serve any of its numerous goals well.
Any plea incentive is inextricably intertwined with issues of attitude, other conduct, the government's preparation, etc. which either get lost in the overwhelming thrust to reward a plea, or worse, prevent the plea incentive from working. How does a court reward the entry of a plea where the defendant has done something (perhaps submitted a bad urine sample) which arguably prevents the allowance of the The courts have reinforced this tie, as demon strated by U. S. v. Tello, 9 F.3d 1119 (5th Cir. 1993 , where the court held that once a court awards the 2 level adjustment for a "timely" plea, the court has no discretion but to award the third point, as well. In that case the defendant gave false information to the probation officer about his criminal history and caused additional investigation to be conducted. The sentencing court increased the sentence for obstruc tion, but, in spite of the guidelines' admonition to the contrary,10 the sentencing court also gave the defen dant the 2-level acceptance reduction because he entered a "timely" plea, but withheld the third level reduction because of the obstruction. The Fifth Circuit held that the court had no discretion to withhold the extra level if it imposed the 2-levels on the basis of a timely plea. The court said that the obstruction "evaporated" once the court awarded the 2-points, and then all that mattered was whether the criteria of the extra point reduction applied.11 There fore, the court must award 3 levels, if any at all, for a timely plea, with no ability to adjust the total reduc tion for any of the other factors involved. and interference between the reward for a plea and the reward (or withholding of the reward) for the other incentives provided in the guideline.
D. Conclusion
The current guideline has generated confusion and litigation. More importantly, it does not allow the court to distinguish between a defendant who merely pleads guilty and one who also does some of the things described in Application Note 1. Admit tedly a court could decide that merely pleading guilty is not enough to be "acceptance of responsibility." However, all courts are confronted with the inescap able fact that, with the increasing federalization of crime, our criminal justice system could not function without a large number of guilty pleas, even if the defendant is willing to do little more than enter the plea. Our proposal recognizes that reality, but allows an additional decrease for the defendant who does more. Options 2 and 3 would make a clear distinction between a guilty plea and a "timely" guilty plea. We would also support a possible 4-level discount in larger cases, as in Option 3, if the Sentencing Commis sion determines this to be acceptable.
Application Note 1 would remain substantially as it is, as a listing of criteria applicable to the determina tion of the "acceptance of responsibility" provision in our proposals. We suggest that a factor be added to that listing: whether the defendant cooperated with the probation officer in providing information necessary for the preparation of the presentence report. (1) If the defendant timely enters a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently, decrease the offense level by 2 levels; and (2) If the defendant otherwise clearly demon strates acceptance of responsibility for the offense, decrease the offense level by 1 level.
(b) Notwithstanding the above, if the defendant's offense level determined prior to the operation of this guideline is below 16, decrease the offense level by no more than 2 levels for this guideline.
Option 2:
(a) Decrease the offense level by up to 3 levels according to the following, independently deter Tables 66 and 67, 1994 Annual 
